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Standing on Unstable Grounds: A 
Reexamination of the WLBT-TV Case1 
 
 
STEVEN DOUGLAS CLASSEN 
 
 
 
 
During the 1960s, disparate discourses of consumerism intersected with 
concerns regarding race and civil rights in the realm of broadcast law and regulation. 
This reexamination of the social and legal struggles surrounding WLBT-TV in 
Jackson, Mississippi (1964-69), shows how conflicting consumerisms were mediated 
by legal institutions in an attempt to address social tensions, and reveals how the 
dominant discourses of liberal consumerism often displaced issues of race. 
 
    In 1962, the "Jackson Nonviolent Also in the spring of 1962, hun- 
Movement" began to change busi- 
ness as usual in Mississippi. The up- 
start organization, comprised largely 
of local teens, targeted prominent 
Jackson businesses, demanding that 
basic employment and consumer 
rights be extended to African Ameri- 
cans.2 They insisted that the segrega- 
tion, degradation, and physical abuse 
grimly familiar to black consumers 
in the white marketplace be con- 
fronted and addressed. In the spring, 
when a pregnant African-American 
mother was verbally and physically 
assaulted by a white grocer, the 
Movement called a church meeting, 
distributed leaflets, and led a success- 
ful boycott against the store. Months 
later, this strategy was reemployed 
with a massive boycott of downtown 
businesses and the demand that "Ne- 
gro consumers ... [be] treated as 
they ought to be-as first class 
citizens" (Salter, 1987, pp. 36, 56). 
dreds of miles to the north, Presi- 
dent john Kennedy returned to a 
popular political campaign theme, 
evoking the concerns of a general- 
ized "consumer" in a congressional 
address. Explicitly, the president al- 
lied himself with this abstract Ameri- 
can. Implicitly, his speech defined 
the consumer as individuated, 
middle-class, moral, and rational. 
Throughout the 1960s such implicit 
political definitions and more ex- 
plicit affirmations of the "American 
consumer" were common, since pro- 
consumer rhetoric was regarded as 
relatively inexpensive and attractive 
to middle-class voters.3 
Although the superficially singu- 
lar discourse of consumerism was 
fully engaged in  Washington a n d  
Jackson, its practices and meanings 
were multiple, mobilized alongside 
different contexts, goals, and con- 
cerns. And in 1964, with a legal chal- 
   lenge to the racist practices and li- 
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cense of a powerful Mississippi 
institution, Jackson’s WLBT-TV, 
the disparate consumer concerns 
articu- 
 
 
 
 
lated in Washington and Jackson 
would find themselves in uneasy jux- 
taposition. Contrary assumptions re- 
garding the free marketplace were 
brought into focus as the Jackson 
Movement argued that consumer- ism 
entailed matters more funda- mental 
than product safety, truthful 
advertising or product choice. This 
paper examines how the multiple dis- 
courses of consumerism intersected 
with the legal struggle over WLBT- 
TV, and with larger social, and spe- 
cifically racial, concerns. 
Scrutiny of this specific moment 
suggests that troubling social prob- 
lems are often elided within the for- 
mal language, analysis, and opera- 
tions of law. Of central concern here 
is how legal decisions and texts deny 
their specifically located social con- 
struction and rely on the appropria- 
tion of liberal discourses to deflect 
direct encounters with social struggle. 
With faith in the adequacy of law's 
formal justifications, traditional 
analyses routinely ignore the social 
tensions and assumptions which un- 
derlie law and regulation. Frequently 
the focus is placed on law's formal 
continuity, its formation in the rari- 
fied climate of judicial and govern- 
mental institutions, or relative tran- 
scendence over everyday life and 
things political. Instead, this essay 
foregrounds the disjunctures and so- 
cial contingency of law and legal 
processes by reexamining the legal 
challenge to the license of WLBT-
TV, describing how dominant 
discourses of consumerism interacted 
with broadcast regulation and 
displaced issues of race.4 
Situating legal struggle in this way 
reveals the problematic consequences 
of translating marginalized or minor- 
ity concerns  into the terms  of the 
dominant liberal legal establishment. 
 
 
Further, it cautions students of law 
and regulation "not to assume the 
coherence and consistency of legal 
discourse but to search out the reso- 
nances of the social, economic, and 
political struggles that reside behind 
the smooth surface of legal reason- 
ing and judicial utterance'' (Hum. 
1985, p. 16). 
 
THE CHALLENGE TO 
WLBT 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the 
WLBT-TV challenge (1964-1969) 
was a defining moment for the broad- 
cast reform movement of the sixties 
and seventies (see discussions of 
Krasnow, Longley and Terry, 1982; 
Rowland, 1982; Haight and Weinstein, 
1981; Cole and Oettinger, 1978). In 
the early seventies, citizen and advo- 
cacy groups employed the "WLBT 
model"-filing petitions to deny li- 
cense renewals-in fights to change 
local broadcast practices. Because the 
extended conflict over the WLBT 
license established strategic and legal 
precedents pertaining to broadcast 
reform, scholars have frequently de- 
scribed the WLBT case and its impor- 
tance.5 Left largely unexamined has 
been the relationship of specific so- 
cial and cultural forces-such as the 
disparate discourses of consumer- 
ism-to the operations of broadcast 
regulation. At the center of this legal 
and cultural contest was the concept 
of the consumer, consumer rights, 
and several related questions: Who 
were the consumers of television, and 
of this particular broadcast outlet? 
What rights, if any, did these consum- 
ers have? From 1964 to 1969, in the 
midst of a decade that saw the rise of 
Ralph Nader, these questions and 
others were  argued  in  various  
forums including the Federal 
Commu- 
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nications Commission (FCC) and the 
District of Columbia Federal Court 
of  Appeals.6 
In April of 1964, a coalition of 
reformers including Aaron Henry, 
the Reverend R.L.T. Smith, and the 
New  York-based  United  Church  of 
Christ (UCC) filed a petition to deny 
the license renewal of WLBT televi- 
sion in Jackson, Mississippi. These 
petitioners, in a cooperative effort 
with other local citizens, began in 
1963 to gather evidence systemati- 
cally demonstrating that the station 
was not meeting local public interest 
standards. Specifically, their formal 
petition alleged: (a) a failure to serve 
the local black population; (b) pro- 
gramming that discriminated against 
blacks; (c) unfairness in the presenta- 
tion of issues, especially about race 
relations; (d) failure to provide the 
community with adequate religious 
and other public affairs program- 
ming; and (e) an excessive amount of 
airtime devoted to commercial an- 
nouncements (Parker, 1972, p. 2). 7 
A lengthy legal battle ensued. Act- 
ing on the 1964 petition, the FCC 
asked the station for programming 
improvement yet granted a short- term 
one year license renewal and dismissed 
the petitioners as lacking formal 
"standing" before the administrative 
body (38 FCC 1143). The petitioners 
appealed this ruling, resulting in the 
1966 District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals decision which will be 
discussed below (359 F.2d 994). The 
1966 judgment remanded consideration 
of the case to the FCC, which held 
formal hearings regarding the original 
complaints and again renewed the 
station's license ( 14 FCC 2d 431). 
Another appeal to the courts was 
made. In 1969 the petitioners claimed 
victory as the same D.C. Court of 
Appeals chastised commis- 
 
 
 
sion hostility toward the public inter- 
venors and revoked the station's li- 
cense (425 F.2d 543). 
Out of this complex legal history, 
the present focus is on the early years 
of this struggle, and, in particular, 
on the legal notion of standing (locus 
standi) which was crucial to the semi- 
nal 1966 Court of Appeals decision. 
Briefly put, the 1966 court ruling 
gave local citizens (audience mem- 
bers) "standing" --entitlement to inter- 
vene (or the right of direct representa- 
tion) in administrative agency (FCC) 
proceedings.  Although "standing" is 
a legal concept most often debated 
on the formal grounds of  process and 
precedents, by employing a social 
historical perspective we can see how  
such  formal concepts operate 
in, and are situated at, specific histori- 
cal conjunctures. 
Since the 1966 Court of Appeals 
decision granted legal standing to 
broadcast consumers, and the 1969 
opinion revoked WLBT's license, 
textbook treatments of this case his- 
tory often implicitly promote the no- 
tion of continuing progress in broad- 
cast regulation and suggest the 
progressive movement in this in- 
stance was largely the result of indi- 
vidual agents and successful legal 
strategy. Rather than attributing a 
legal decision to judicial idiosyncrasy 
or inherently superior arguments and 
formal technique, the task here is to 
ask how popular and legal dis- 
courses concerning race and consum- 
erism converged and shaped social 
and legal consciousness in a particu- 
lar instance. 
 
 
"Don't Buy Segregation" 
 
In 1962, even as President 
Kennedy was announcing what he 
called the consumer's "bill of 
rights," 
  
 
 
including a "consumer's right to be 
heard," African Americans in Missis- 
sippi were testing their voices and 
power as consumers in a state notori- 
ous for racial violence and oppres- 
sion. In the small delta community of 
Clarksdale, activists engaged in a per- 
sistent boycott of merchants with a 
history of racial discrimination. The 
grassroots effort, led by local resi- 
dent and state NAACP president 
Aaron Henry, was maintained tor 
several months and had a significant 
economic impact on downtown busi- 
nesses (Salter, 1987, pp. 29-36). 
In the winter of 1962, Jackson be- 
came the site of a massive grassroots 
effort aimed at pressuring stores and 
services dependent upon black pa- 
tronage. The Jackson Nonviolent 
Movement lasted more than six 
months and had initial leadership 
from the North Jackson Youth Coun- 
cil of the NAACP, a group of young 
students advised by Tougaloo Col- 
lege professor John Salter. The 
movement received additional guid- 
ance and support from other promi- 
nent black Missisippians, including 
Aaron Henry, Rev. R.L.T. Smith, 
Rev. G.R. Haughton, and NAACP 
field secretary Medgar Evers. 
Planning for the boycott campaign 
began in the fall of  1962, and in- 
cluded a study of job and consumer 
conditions   in  Jackson. Organizer 
John Salter had been impressed by 
recent direct action campaigns out- 
side of the state and was eager to 
mobilize the local Black community 
(Salter, 1987, pp. 39, 51-52). On No- 
vember 30, 1962, the official bulletin 
of the North Jackson Youth Council 
(NAACP), the North Jackson Action, 
declared "The boycott is now official 
. . . picket lines and mass meetings 
are definitely set." The front page 
 
 
highlighted “a brief statement of 
grievances" discussing the problem 
of employment discrimination, and 
continued: 
     Negro consumers are forced to use 
separate restrooms, separate drinking 
fountains, and very frequently are 
forced to use separate seating facilities 
in the stores. Often, they are forced to 
stand. Negro customers are the last to 
be waited on. In any dispute between 
a clerk and a customer, the customer 
is always wrong -- if he or she is a 
Negro. Many of the white 
businessmen are members and 
supporters of the viciously anti-
Negro White Citizens Council-
whose national head- quarters is in 
Jackson .... Brutality, levied against. 
Negro people, has frequently occurred 
in the stores of white businessmen 
(North Jackson Youth Council, Pa- 
pers of John R. Salter, Jr., Box l, 
Folder 15). 
Attempting to draw further atten- 
tion to these practices downtown, 
picketing demonstrations joined the 
selective buying effort in December, 
just in time to affect the holiday shop- 
ping season. The Youth Council or- 
ganized a systematic phone calling 
campaign and pamphlet distribution 
strategies to inform the black commu- 
nity of its actions and goals. Salter 
(1987, p. 101) recalls that almost 
60,000 leaflets were distributed in 
the first six months of the campaign, 
and that "boycott workers had spo- 
ken at length in almost every Negro 
church in Jackson-and most  of these 
churches had been visited manv times." 
Since police harassed or arrested 
those engaged in the distribution of 
boycott information, student workers 
used unusual, sometime secretive 
techniques, carrying materials in paper 
bags, umbrellas, and under their coats, 
moving quickly through different 
parts of Jackson (Salter, 1987, p. 71). 
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These extraordinary communica- 
tions efforts were necessary because 
the mainstream print and electronic 
media of Jackson  provided  visually no 
opportunities for black voices to be 
heard or pro-movement arguments to 
be made. Two newspapers dominated 
the daily print media, namely, the 
Clarion-Ledger and the Jackson Daily 
News, and were both owned by the 
powerful Hederman family, which had a 
significant invest- ment in downtown 
business as well as the segregationist 
status quo. Front page editorials and 
columns in these papers frequently 
leveled withering attacks on the federal 
government and civil rights activities. In 
response to the boycott, the papers 
offered loud condemnations of it, and 
ran ads urging readers to shop down- 
town. 
The Hederman family  also con- 
trolled a substantial portion of the 
broadcast market, owning WJTV one 
of  two  network-affiliated  television 
stations in Jackson. WJTV's 
programming practices, while not the 
focus of history textbooks, were quite 
similar to those at WLBT. In fact, 
the petitioners of WLBT originally 
challenged both stations' licenses, 
articulating several identical 
complaints, including racial 
discrimination. In the case of 
WJTV, a few signs of programming 
adaptability helped shift the focus of 
legal efforts to the more recalcitrant 
WLBT. 
WLBTs connection to the white 
business establishment and most 
powerful state politicians was quite 
dear. Fred Beard, the station's gen- 
eral manager, was a prominent mem- 
ber of the anti-integration White 
Citizen's Council, as were many 
downtown businessmen and prominent 
Mississippi lawmakers (McMillen, 
1971). In fact, on at least one occa- 
sion, Beard was vigorously ap- 
plauded by Citizen's Council mem- 
bers when he announced the station's 
active censorship of pro-integration 
programming. WLBT also had a 
"Freedom Bookstore'' on its pre- 
mises, filled with Citizen's Council 
and white supremacist literature. 
Economically, the station had a dose 
relationship with Citizen's Council 
businessmen and downtown stores in 
terms of long-term advertising ac- 
counts. In short, the station had very 
powerful economic and political al- 
lies, and only the marshalling of con- 
siderable political and legal resources 
would bring about a change in its 
racist practices. 
It was the station's allies that were 
under direct attack during the 
Jackson  movement.  In order to 
counter perceptions that it was with- 
out concrete goals, the movement 
issued a concise list of demands in 
January of 1963: 
 
(I) Hiring of personnel on the basis 
of personal merit without regard to 
race, color or creed; and promotion 
of such personnel on the basis of both 
merit and seniority without regard to 
race, color or creed; (2) an end to 
segregated drinking fountains, an end 
to segregated re- strooms, and an end 
to segregated seat- ing; (3) service to 
all consumers on a first come, first 
served basis; (4) use of cour- tesy 
titles-such as "Miss," "Mrs.," and 
"Mr."-with regard to all people (Pa- 
pers of John R. Salter, Jr., Box I, 
Folder 14). 
As Liz Cohen (1992, p. 9) has ob- 
served, the Jackson movement, while 
acknowledging the need for equality 
in the sphere of production (hiring 
and promotion) focused on the 
problems of local black consumption. 
In her broader analysis of civil 
rights 
ill  
 
 
 
activism, Cohen identifies the exis- 
tence of a postwar politics of con- 
sumption "oriented around black's 
rights as consumers, not just 
producers" (p. 8). She argues that 
"although access to jobs remained on 
the agenda of civil rights activists in 
the early 1960s, they now saw 
consumption and production rights as  
...intenwined" (p. 8). 
While articulating "civil rights 
problems" during the selective buy- 
ing campaign, Jackson movement 
leaders such as Rev.  R.L.T. Smith 
put the "denial of human dignity" at 
the top of their public complaints, 
and called for local recognition of 
''freedom and human dignity" at 
mass meetings held in Jackson 
churches (Papers of Rev. R.L.T. 
Smith, Box 3, Folder 28). Clearly, 
this call was associated with the con- 
crete experiences of African Ameri- 
cans shopping in downtown Jackson, 
denied access to bathrooms and wa- 
ter fountains, and often ignored by 
white employees. In the months af- 
ter the movement disbanded, the pe- 
titioners challenging WLBT echoed 
this theme, complaining that the sta- 
tion undermined black dignity by fail- 
ing, for example, to use courtesy titles 
in addressing black personalities and 
events. 
The Jackson movement's concerns 
and demands were quite different 
from those articulated by John 
Kennedy just months earlier on be- 
half of what he called the "American 
consumer." The president identified 
four primary consumer concerns and 
corresponding rights: (1) the "right 
to safety" which dealt with protec- 
tion from hazardous goods; (2) the 
"'right to be informed," which was 
concerned with protection against 
fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly mis- 
 
 
leading information in media such as 
broadcast advertising; (3) "the right. 
to choose," concerned with "access 
to a variety of products and services 
at competitive prices"; and (4) "the 
right to be heard,'' an assurance "'that 
consumer interests will receive full 
and sympathetic consideration in the 
formulation of government policy, 
and fair and expeditious treatment 
in its administrative tribunals" (such 
as the  FTC and FCC)  (Lampman, J 
988, p. 22). 
Such pronouncements could be 
understood as both expansive and 
restrictive. While the president's 
speech provided a symbolic alliance 
with "the American consumer," and 
symbolically expanded "consumer 
rights,'' it also set implicit limitations 
on the government's interests in these 
matters. As one of his key speech 
writers has put it, Kennedy's an- 
nouncement of these "rights" served 
to "define and limit the field of con- 
sumer protection and to identify le- 
gitimate policy choices vis-a-vis con- 
sumer markets" (Lampman, 1988. 
p. 31). Aside from a cautious and 
vague endorsement of consumer rep- 
resentation, the executive statement 
established as paramount safer goods 
and "improving the level of con- 
sumer satisfaction from a given level 
of expenditure" (Lampman, 1988, p. 
29). 
     Focusing on consumer satisfaction 
derived from favorable economic ex- 
change, Kennedy implicitly defined 
the  "American  consumer''  as indi- 
vidualized and autonomous, enjoy- 
ing free access to the marketplace 
independent of the social divisions 
and constraints experienced  every- 
day by thousands of Jackson shop- 
pers. Missing was the movement's 
recognition of a basic need to affirm 
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the human dignity and worth of con- 
sumers. The Jackson movement had 
issued its own version of a bill of 
rights for consumers, arguing that 
an entire class of citizens had been 
abused within, and often excluded 
from, the free marketplace. At the 
same time, in Washington, political 
discourse symbolically erased social 
differences in consumer experiences 
and worked to reestablish the vision 
of a fundamentally fair marketplace 
that balanced the interests of indi- 
vidual consumers and producers. 
Certainly these segregated con- 
sumers had been influenced by the 
popular consumerist discourse of the 
period, as is evident both in the 
Jackson movement's newsletters and 
more widely throughout the South 
(Cohen, 1992). However, the mean- 
ings of consumerism were appropri- 
ated differently and specifically in 
response to crises such as those expe- 
rienced in Jackson. It is clear that the 
direct action campaign undertaken 
in Mississippi's capital contained a 
considerable current of dissatisfac- 
tion with the federal government, 
law, and formal announcements from 
Washington. Local direct action rep- 
resented impatience with legal and 
bureaucratic efforts. As Silver ( 1963, 
p. 342) and others have noted, many 
activists in the state were "unim- 
pressed with legalism and and 
constitutionalism," favoring the use 
of grassroots campaigns aimed at 
problems needing immediate rem- 
edy. 
In this environment the license of 
WLBT-TV was challenged. The sta- 
tion never faced a direct action cam- 
paign, although African Americans 
had long complained about its pro- 
gramming. Rather, the battle over 
WLBT would be waged primarily in 
the realm  of the legal and bureau- 
cratic, with all of its attendant dan- 
gers. Because local black Mississippi-
ans lacked the enormous economic 
and legal resources necessary for a 
protracted licensing battle and ad- 
ministrative challenge, the task fell 
largely to media activists and attor- 
neys associated with the United 
Church of Christ (UCC). 
 
Shifting Standards of Standing 
 
Before the challenge from the UCC 
and its co-petitioners, both the FCC 
and federal courts handling broad- 
casting concerns had granted "stand- 
ing to intervene" only to legislators 
and those parties "operating in the 
public interest," demonstrating suffi- 
cient economic injury or electrical 
interference. Those parties success- 
fully claiming economic injury and 
electrical interference were invari- 
ably commercial and industrial enti- 
ties. Although the courts insisted that 
standing was considered in the light 
of larger public rather than private 
interest concerns, members of the 
listening and viewing audience, "the 
public," were not formally and di- 
rectly recognized or represented, but 
only indirectly considered through 
the various arguments of industry 
and government. As one legal ana- 
lyst summarized, "the courts had ap- 
parently given at least tacit approval 
to the [Federal Communication] 
Commission's standing construction, 
for in no instance had standing to 
contest a licensing order been up- 
held on any other ground" ("Recent 
developments," 1967, p. 520). That 
is, until 1966, with the release of the 
WLBT-TV decision. 
With WLBT, the courts' position 
on standing shifted. Dissatisfied with 
the aforementioned precedents, the 
  
 
 
 
Court of Appeals established that the 
listening public was now to be consid- 
ered as potentially "aggrieved" by 
renewal of broadcast station licenses, 
and as a potential "party in interest" 
empowered to challenge license 
grants and renewals. In granting 
standing to the appellants, Warren 
Burger wrote for Circuit Judges 
McGowan and Tamm: 
 
Since the concept of standing is a practi- 
cal and functional one designed to in- 
sure that only those with a genuine and 
legitimate interest can participate in a 
proceeding, we can see no reason to 
exclude those with such an obvious and 
acute concern as the listening audience. 
This much seems essential to insure that 
the holders of broadcasting licenses be 
responsive to the needs of the audience, 
without which the broadcaster could not 
exist (59 F.2d 1002). 
In granting standing to represen- 
tatives of the "listening audience," 
the court recognized it had broken 
away from previous, more restricted 
notions of standing, admitting that 
"'up to this time, the courts have 
granted standing to intervene  only to 
those alleging electrical interfer- 
ence ... or alleging some economic 
injury" (359 F.2d 1000). However, 
now the court had decided to ex- 
pand notions of public interest be- 
yond those represented in the con- 
stricted categories of the past. 
Claiming a new flexibility and ability 
to adapt based on experience, the 
court continued: "... What the Com- 
mission apparently fails to see in the 
present case is that the courts have 
resolved questions of standing as they 
arose and have at no time manifested 
an intent to make economic interest 
and electrical interference the exclu- 
sive grounds for standing" (359 F.2d 
1000-1001). 
 
Such remarks implied the Court 
of Appeals was attempting to dis- 
tance itself from the FCC. Passages 
such as the one above suggest that 
the commission had a certain inflex- 
ibility which the court was now rebuk- 
ing and positioning as detrimental to 
the public interest. 
     This r e bu ke  seems  to have  little 
justification  in terms of legal coher- 
ency. Indeed, in terms of coherency. 
the commission's, not the court's, de- 
cision would seem to be much stron- 
ger. The former's determination w a s  
based on well- established and often 
cited precedents such as FCC r1. San-
ders Brothers Radio Station ( 1940), 
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.  v.   FCC 
( 1942), and NBC v. FCC (1942). It is 
also worth repeating that the court 
had given at least its tacit approval to 
these prior commission construc- 
tions of standing. 
However, in this case, the court 
took great pains to f oreground the 
flexibility and dynamism of stand- 
ing. Standing was defined as a "prac- 
tical and functional concept." After 
tracing a case history of standing law. 
the court remarked, "This history 
indicates that neither administrative 
nor judicial concepts of standing have 
been static" (359 F.2d 1000). 
In addressing the FCC argument 
that the commission itself could fairly 
represent the listening audience and 
thus eliminate the need for further 
formal public representation, the 
court again implied that the commis- 
sion had been unjustifiably rigid in 
contrast to the judicial body's reason- 
able, flexible, commonsensical dispo- 
sition. In a passage which damages 
claims to formalistic justification by 
constitutionality, process, or prece- 
dents, Burger wrote that "experi· 
ence" linked to an implied "common 
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sense” had guided the decision-mak- 
ing: 
 
The theory that the Commission can 
always effectively represent the listener 
interests in a renewal proceeding with- 
out the aid and participation of legiti- 
mate listener representatives fulfilling the 
role of private attorneys general is one of 
those assumptions we collectively try to 
work with so long as they are reasonably 
adequate. When it becomes clear, as it 
does now, that it is no longer a valid 
assumption which stands up under the 
realities of actual experience, neither we 
nor the Commission can continue to rely 
on it. The gradual expansion and evolu- 
tion of concepts of standing in adminis- 
trative law attests that experience rather 
than logic or fixed rules has been ac- 
cepted as the guide (359 F.2d 1003-- 
1004). 
 
This paragraph asserts rather 
baldly that the court's standing deci- 
sions had been based on consider- 
ations outside those of constitutional- 
ity, process, and precedents. It 
explicitly privileged "experience" 
over formalistic legal "logic" or "fixed 
rules." The grounds for standing had 
uneasily shifted, with little legal ratio- 
nale available outside of "it seems to 
be the best decision in this instance, 
given the experience of past years." 
Elaborating on this rationale, Keller 
(1967, p. 135) wrote that the court 
recognized that previously narrow 
constructions of standing "had not 
achieved the desired result," ostensi- 
bly of serving the "public interest," 
and therefore was advocating a new 
standing construction. Even tradi- 
tional legal analysts noted the court's 
lack of formal justification in this shift, 
stating in one instance that the deci- 
sion underscored the "burdensome 
and artificial construction of stand- 
ing requirements" ("Notes," p. 384). 
The Court of Appeals' writing re- 
garding standing and WLBT high- 
lighted a problem that is central to 
the critical legal studies critique of 
traditional legal practice, namely, the 
fundamental indeterminacy of law.8 
In this case, the court explicitly dis- 
posed of the idea that standing had 
a natural, inherent, or self-evident 
meaning. Rather, its meaning had 
been, and continues to be, a site of 
social and legal struggle, dynamic 
through time and place. In this his- 
tory, the court made the point of 
discarding the arguments regarding 
constitutionality, process, and prece- 
dents advanced by the FCC, subordi- 
nating such claims to consideration 
of "nonlegal" variables, such as 
industrial and "consumer" 
conditions. Clearly, social factors 
surrounding the case were important 
to the judicial decision. 
Further,  the  court  statements  to 
the FCC regarding the strengths of 
the minority complaint suggest that 
the judges  pondered  the  merits  of 
the  legal  challenge  when   formal 
guidelines dictated that standing was 
to be determined a priori (359 F.2d 
1006--1009). The court's concluding 
remarks underscored its concern as 
it surveyed the station's history and 
stated "a pious hope on the Commis- 
sion’s part f o r  better t h i n g s  
f ro m  WLBT is not a substitute for 
evidence and findings" (359 F.2d 
1008). Critics noticed this formal 
transgression, questioning the 
appropriateness of court remarks 
suggesting how the FCC should  
have ruled in its initial statement 
regarding WLBT li- cense renewal 
(38 FCC 1143 [1965]). The 
Michigan Law Review (1967, p. 
524), for example, remarked that the 
propriety of the court's approach was 
questionable" since policy determina-   
 
 tions are clearly within the 
exclusive scope of the Commission’s 
expertise.” 
The WBLT case does not stand 
alone in regard to this type of formal 
transgression. In analysis of 
constitutional standing, for example, 
critics have argued that standing has 
become “a surrogate for decisions on 
merits” and that the law of standing 
“is little more than a set of disjointed 
rules dealing with dealing with a 
common subject” (Tushnett, 1977, p. 
663). In this surrogacy, standing law 
denies its social construction and 
social specificity, cloaking itself in 
an a priori rationale claiming a clean 
separation from consideration of 
contemporary social conditions. 
The WLBT decision threatens to 
strip this cloak from standing law, 
exposing the social and cultural 
forces at work I such decision-
making. A more than cursory 
examination of the precedent-setting 
1966 Court of Appeals decision 
supports the contention that standing 
law is fundamentally indeterminate 
as are the meanings of specific legal 
terms such as “the public interest.” 
Further, it reveals a moment in which 
formalistic justification for legal 
standing and specific case merits 
were conflated in an environment of 
considerable social struggle.  
Transforming Viewers 
To better understand the 1966 Court 
decision regarding standing, it is 
necessary to look more closely at how this 
judicial body defined various social 
groups and consider how these definitions 
related to a specific social milieu. This is 
not to suggest that legal texts or 
definitions simply reflect the social realm, 
but that such discourses emerge in an 
interactive and creative way, working on 
social 
 
 
 
 
conditions even as such conditions shape 
them. 
     By 1960 broadcasting was increasingly 
defined as a consumer concern. Quiz show 
scandals and FCC commissioner 
misconduct had brought television into 
disrepute, and these exploitations of a 
relatively young and promising medium 
were widely publicized in the popular 
press, arousing public dissatisfaction 
(Boddy, 1990). At the same time, 
prominent political leaders such as 
Kennedy campaigned to align themselves 
with government protection or the 
consumer (Pertschuk, 1982). As Pertschuk 
( 1982, p. 17) has noted, Kennedy's 
"consumer" campaign speech was greeted 
enthusiastically, and "opinion polls showed 
broad, though not necessarily deep, public 
endorsement of ... consumer protection 
initiatives." 
     In 1962, the president established a 
Consumer Advisory Council which had 
liaisons with various federal administrative 
agencies, including the FCC. And in 1964, 
as Lyndon Johnson established the 
President's Committee on Consumer 
Interests, his special assistant for consumer 
affairs, Esther Peterson, continued the 
communication between the executive 
branch and the FCC. During these years, 
the White House occasionally asked the 
commission for an account of activities it 
had undertaken in the interest of the 
American consumer. Thus, FCC actions 
such as their work on the "All Channel 
Receiver Bill" were called to the attention 
of the White House as "efforts to help the 
consumer" (Papers of E. William Henry, 
Box 76, "Assistant for Consumer Affairs" 
and "White House Correspondence").!~ 
      In the popular press, a January,
  
1960,cover article titled "Where, may 
we ask, was the FCC?" in Consumer 
Reports, blasted the commission for 
inactivity and "passing the buck" es- 
pecially in regard to "false and 
irritating" advertising. The article 
warned that by flooding air channels 
with poor programming and ads, 
broadcasting companies could "deci- 
mate the consumer use-value of all 
receiving sets" (p. 9). Calling for the 
"implementation of the consumer po- 
sition in Government," the article 
nominated television as the nation's 
dominant consumer concern, stating 
"the consumer investment in and the 
consumer interest in television and 
radio dwarf that of any other 
segment" (pp. 11, 9). 
Faced with public anxiety over ad- 
vertising and claims that ads were 
increasingly false and pervasive, the 
FCC, under the leadership of Newton 
Minow (1961-63) and William Henry 
(1963-66), launched campaigns 
against overcommercialization in 
broadcasting (Baughman, 1985, pp. 
117-152). Congressional members, 
acting as defenders of the broadcast 
industry, were persistent in curtail- 
ing these administrative agency ef- 
forts. However, powerful FCC com- 
missioners believed that the public 
shared their displeasure with the 
number of commercials aired and the 
"ever increasing interruption of 
programs" (Baughman, 1985, p. 
123). 
William Henry, FCC chair during 
the early years of the WLBT chal- 
lenge, encouraged the commission's 
broadcast bureau to "closely check 
individual renewal applications for 
the number of commercial messages 
pledged on the license form versus 
those actually aired" (Baughman, 
1985,  p.   134). In  mid-1964,   the 
 
broadcast bureau, again with Henry's 
support, unsuccessfully attempted to 
take punitive action against specific 
stations located in Louisiana, Missis- 
sippi, and Arkansas accused of broad- 
casting too many commercials 
(Baughman, 1985, p. 135). 
With this as a historical backdrop, 
the legal texts of the WLBT struggle 
are better understood. For example, it 
comes as no surprise that the United 
Church of Christ legal team, 
counseled by former FCC staff mem- 
ber Ann Aldrich, included a com- 
plaint of overcommercialization in 
the WLBT petition to deny licens- 
ing. Such a complaint, seemingly 
trivial in comparison to charges of 
racist programming, resonated with 
public and FCC concerns. Even after 
the 1966 court decision ignored the 
overcommercialization charge, the 
UCC petitioned the FCC to revisit its 
complaint regarding too many ads (5 
FCC2d 37). 
Beyond the contention that adver- 
tisements were too frequent and in- 
terruptive, anxieties regarding false 
or misleading ads were closely linked 
to notions of consumerism and eco- 
nomic protection. Applied to broad- 
casting, the logic of consumerism 
again focused on expenditure and 
the viewer's return from financial in- 
vestment. Consumer protection was 
not so much protection from frustra- 
tion or annoyance or more threaten- 
ing systemic injustices as from unin- 
formed, irrational, or unwise 
investment-in other words, protec- 
tion from "not getting one's money's 
worth." This concern was evident, 
for example, in the 1960 Consumer 
Reports article, as it foregrounded 
public spending on television and 
radio purchases and spoke of "con- 
sumer use-value." This economic 
  
 
 
logic was also clear in the arguments 
employed by the UCC legal team in 
the WLBT case, and was adopted by 
the court in its 1966 opinion. The 
contention of the petitioners was that 
the public, through ownership of sets 
and their appurtenances, had a large 
economic stake in broadcasting, had 
not received a fair return for its in- 
vestment, and therefore deserved le- 
gal standing as an economically ag- 
grieved party (Parker, 1982). 
This argument provided the awk- 
ward equation through which the 
court defined local African-Ameri- 
can concerns as synonymous with the 
those of the American consumer. The 
judges gave considerable discussion 
to the specific history and practices 
of WLBT early in the opinion, focus- 
ing hard on the allegations of racial 
discrimination. However, as the court 
articulated its position regarding the 
issue of standing, considerations of 
this history dropped out of its writ- 
ing in deference to formal constraints 
dictating standing be considered only 
in relation to specific persons, firms, 
or corporations, rather than social 
classes or groups. 
Such constraints were, and con- 
tinue to be, the product of American 
legal liberalism-a philosophical 
framework that reproduces the arti- 
ficial dichotomization of the indi- 
vidual and society and inconsistently 
privileges individual liberty over so- 
cial responsibility. Working and writ- 
ing within this tradition, the court 
was formally mandated to address 
specific economic grievances-indi- 
vidual material losses-rather than 
systemic discrimination. This was, 
and is, the purview of administrative 
jurisprudence. 
Thus the court drew parallels be- 
tween the consumers of margarine. 
 
 
 
coal, electricity, and broadcasting, ar- 
guing that consumers of these and 
other commodities had certain eco- 
nomic claims, and in some cases had 
been granted temporary standing be- 
fore administrative agencies such as 
the Federal Trade Commission. Con- 
tending that television "consumers" 
and consumers of margarine needed 
similar administrative protections, the 
court's opinion reflected a temporary 
and artificial, yet formally 
demanded, separation of social justice 
from individual consumer concerns. 
     The court's defense of individu-
ated television consumers was 
summed up with a quotation from 
Edmond Cahn:  "Some consumers 
need bread; others need Shakespeare; 
others need their rightful place  in the 
national society-what they all need is 
processors of law who will consider 
the people's needs more significant 
than administrative convenience" 
(359 F.2d 1005). Employing such 
liberal proclamations, the court 
transposed middle-class assumptions 
onto other groups, in this case, pre- 
dominantly working and underclass 
African Americans in the nation's 
poorest state. Discussing which par- 
ties should be officially recognized 
rather than deemed legally invisible, 
the court effectively subordinated 
concrete cultural concerns regarding 
popular representation to the 
economic logic of consumer protec- 
tion. 
The argument that viewers should 
be principally defined as consumers 
owning television sets, thus holding 
an economic stake in local broadcast- 
ing, had little resonance with many 
poor African Americans, even if ac- 
cepted at face value. Such consumer 
protections assumed the citizen was 
economically independent, when this 
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was hardly  the case for many black 
Mississippians.    Truly    independent 
consumer choices were a luxury af- 
forded relatively few African Ameri- 
cans in the state. Further, although 
television purchases escalated nation- 
wide in the sixties, census data reveal 
that "nonwhite" households in Missis- 
sippi lagged well behind other popu- 
lations in the acquisition of this tech- 
nology, at least in the late fifties. 
Considerably less than half, approxi- 
mately 40 percent of "nonwhite" 
households in Mississippi had televi- 
sions as the decade began, compared to 
television's presence in 66 percent of 
"all occupied  households  in  the 
state."  In impoverished rural areas, 
even a smaller percentage of nonwhite 
households had a set at home (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1963). 
     Thus, the court's discussion of 
standing via consumerism, while 
resonating with federal legislation 
prohibiting public discrimination 
against customers, effectively ignored 
important social differences and his- 
tories in a construction of the homog- 
enized, individualized television 
viewer-consumer. Anxiety regarding 
the state's address of racial conflict 
was displaced by "consumer" and 
"public interest" concerns, and in a 
larger sense, by the formal demands 
of legal liberalism, with its dichotomi- 
zation of public and private, as well 
as individual and social, interests. 
This symbolic displacement, how- 
ever temporary, allowed the state, 
represented by the Court of Appeals, 
to address a race-based threat t.o so- 
cial and economic stability, via an 
official legal discourse, without di- 
rectly appearing to offer such an ad- 
dress. As Vincent Mosco (1989, p. 
118) points out in a discussion of 
government, hegemony, and federal 
broadcast policy, the state is respon- 
sible for controlling antagonisms be- 
fore they become systemic conflicts. 
One of the means noted as working 
toward this end is identification of 
social agents not as members of an- 
tagonistic classes [or races]-but as 
individual legal subjects. In comple- 
mentary fashion, "the state presents 
itself as the agent for solving the 
problems of individual juridicial 
citizens..." (Mosco, 1989, p. 119). In 
Washington, the Kennedy adminis- 
tration threw support behind en- 
deavors aimed at the furtherance of 
individual voting and consumer 
rights rather than rallies and large- 
scale public protests. As historian 
David Chalmers (1991, pp. 23, 40) 
has noted, the national government 
was not willing to directly challenge the 
Southern status quo much be- yond 
the issue of voting rights, and as "the 
civil rights strategy of the early 
sixties increasingly became one of 
forcing the issue in the streets, ... the 
administration treated it as a problem 
of conflict containment." Members of 
the Jackson movement frequently 
complained about the lack of federal 
support for their highly visible direct 
action campaign. In this case, the 
court's choice to deal with the 
petitioners as representative of 
consumers worked to atomize or iso- 
late the complainants as individual 
consumers of the television program- 
ming. The court's employment of the 
Cahn quotation foregrounded this 
atomization quite clearly, with the 
message that "some consumers need 
this, others that." The court's alterna- 
tive, guarded against by the rules 
and procedures of legal liberalism, 
was more menacing-to recognize 
that the petitioners represented the 
  
 
concerns of a race or an aggregate 
threat. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In addressing the WLBT case, FCC 
Chairman E. William Henry declared 
in 1965 that the issue at hand was 
"not civil rights," but "the integrity 
of the public interest standard and 
the Commission's renewal process'' 
(38 FCC 1153). This study directly 
challenges such a claim, arguing the 
WLBT case was very much about 
civil rights, as well as other social 
dynamics. The symbolic evacuation 
of racial struggle evident in Henry's 
quotation, if accepted uncritically, 
leads t o a superficial understanding 
of an important moment in 
American law and history, and 
reinforces a dichotomy of legal 
reasoning and social change. To 
contend that notions such as the 
"public interest," or the formalistic 
legal/administrative process, are the 
central issues in such a case is to 
grant them an undeserved autonomy--
one that denies their relationship to, 
and degree of dependence on, central 
social and political forces. 
     Situating the WLBT-TV fight 
within the 1960s civil rights movement 
reveals how this struggle echoes the 
strategies and ambiguous legacy of the 
movement as a whole.10 On the level 
of local and tactical politics, such 
challenges were part of campaigns that 
offered moments of empowerment and 
resistance for African Americans. 
Although it is difficult to gauge    the    
empowerment    experienced by black 
Mississippians in their moments of 
resistance and challenge to WLBT, the 
local implications of such activism 
should not be ignored or devalued.  At 
the very least, the attacks on WLBT 
forced Jackson stations 
 
 
to curb  practices  that  were deeply 
painful  to  people  of  color, and 
initiated the process by which the 
station was awarded to a majority- 
black coalition in 1979.   
     On another level, in terms of indus- 
trial and regulatory structures or ex- 
isting patterns of power, the station 
challenge  and  court  decisions  did 
little more than ratify the status quo 
by suggesting that the regulatory sys- 
tem  was  corrective-that  it  indeed 
worked. While the 1966 ruling re- 
garding legal standing for WLBT 
viewers energized and facilitated the 
broadcast reform movement, by the 
late seventies further bureaucratic re- 
trenchment effectively diminished the 
power of this legal precedent and 
ensuing activism even before Reagan 
administration deregulation. II 
      With the Reagan administration, 
an argument  was reenergized  that 
continues  today,  namely  that  ad- 
dress of legal questions such as stand- 
ing or rights should be color-blind. 
This contention is prominent in con- 
temporary debates revolving around 
problems as varied as voting rights 
and FCC licensing. Hopefully, the 
analysis offered here warns that to 
adopt a color-blind approach or ad- 
dress is to, among other things, ab- 
stract issues of race from history and 
reproduce the liberal myth of a fun- 
damentally fair marketplace that 
magically balances disparate social in- 
terests. Critical observers of race rela- 
tions and law convincingly demon- 
strate that the ahistorical standard of 
color-blindness fails to achieve the 
race neutrality it formally claims. As 
one African-American scholar puts it, 
to believe "that color-blind policies 
represent the only legitimate and 
effective means of ensuring a racially 
equitable society, one would have to
87 
CLASSEN CSMC 
 
 
 
assume ... that such a racially equi- 
table society already exists" (Crenshaw, 
1988, p. 1344). In the formal claims 
of color-blindness and equal process, 
social and historical differences are 
dismissed. A quote from Patricia 
Williams (1991, p. 48) serves well in 
summarizing this point: 
 
Law and legal writing aspire to 
formal- ized, color-blind, liberal ideals. 
Neutral- ity is the standard for assuring 
these ideals; yet the adherence to it is 
often determined by reference to an 
aesthetic of uniformity, in which 
difference is simply omitted. For 
example, when segregation was 
eradicated from the American lexicon, 
its omission led many to believe that 
racism therefore no longer existed. 
Race-neutrality in law has become the 
presumed antidote for race bias in real 
life. 
 
Even as American law proclaims 
its lack of formal bias, we can see in 
specific instances, such as the WLBT 
case, that social concerns and pres- 
sures often force breaks in legal rea- 
soning--disjunctures that are inad- 
equately explained by law itself. In 
the examination of these breaks or 
formal gaps, there should be a sensi- 
tivity to the struggle surrounding of- 
ficial and popular discourses, such as 
those of consumerism, and their in- 
tersection with law. In the sixties, 
consumerism was invoked both by 
civil rights activists and federal insti- 
tutions in the context of establishing 
new law or policy. For those in the 
Jackson movement, consumer con- 
cerns called for the recognition of 
social differences and a response to 
the historic, long-term neglect of the 
free market. From Washington, the 
discourses of consumerism effaced 
social differences and tensions, re- 
producing the model of the individ- 
uated American consumer and the 
vision of an essentially fair, consumer- 
producer balanced society. In the 
rhetoric of the Court of Appeals and 
institutions of law, we see the uncom- 
fortable mediation of these conflict- 
ing consumerisms, and an attempt to 
address racial tensions accompanied 
by a simultaneous displacement of 
these concerns. 
 
NOTES 
 
1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1993 meeting of the Society for Cinema 
Studies. I gratefully acknowledge the consistent encouragement and insights of John Fiske and Lynn 
Spigel, and thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable critiques. 
2Among the early leadership of the Movement were John and Eldri Salter of Tougaloo College 
and Medgar Evers, field secretary of the Mississippi NAACP. The Salters began working with the 
North Jackson Youth Council of the NAACP shortly after their 1961 arrival in Jackson. This Council 
formed the early core of the Movement. John Salter recalls that a great majority of recruits to the 
Movement were high school students, and that they had "reached the point where they perceived 
the injustices very clearly, and they also saw the vision very clearly. They just didn't feel inhibited 
...they were the backbone of the boycott and the backbone of the mass marches" (Oral History of 
John Salter, pp. 29-30). In 1963, after his appointment as chaplain at Tougaloo, the Reverend Ed 
King also played a key leadership role in Movement activities. 
3Kennedy's March 15, 1962 speech was titled "Special Message to the Congress on 
Protecting the Consumer Interest" ("Public papers," pp. 235-243). Creighton (1976) de- scribes 
this public employment of concern for the consumer, noting that in political speeches consumers could 
be attractively framed as "individuals and households unsullied by govern- mental malfeasance" (p. 
42). Pertschuk (1982) also provides insightful analysis of this period. A focus on the "consumer" was not 
only evident in political pronouncements, but in popular 
  
press treatments of civil rights activism. For example, in NBC"s three hour primetime special tided 'The 
American Revolution of 1968,•• a '"study of the American Negro's struggle for equality," host Frank 
Magee sought to "define this revolution" as having as an immediate goal "what might be called consumer 
rights as easily as civil rights...." 
4This approach is informed by work in the critical legal studies (CLS) movement. For example, 
in an introduction to CLS, Kelman (1987) writes, "CLS theorists have devoted" great deal of their efforts 
to demonstrating that law and society are inseparable or interpenetrating and arguing that traditional 
pictures of that relationship between law and society that ignore that point almost invariably make law 
seem both more important than it is (in supposing that particular structures require particular rules) and 
less important than it. is (in ignoring its basic constitutive nature)" (p. 7). 
5As Haight and Weinstein (1981) have observed, the victory of local petitioners in the WLBT 
case "gave tremendous hope to prospective petitioners that further gains could be made by taking this 
'legal route'" (p. 115). Such challenges were viewed as opening "doors for reforming the media through 
the administrative process" (Haight and Weinstein, p. I 15: also see Branscomb and Savage, 1978). As 
scholars have subsequently noted, these hopes for long-term reform were poorly founded (Rowland, 
1982; Haight and Weinstein, 1981). However, the WLBT case offered strategic legal "tools" for broadcast 
reform activities in the late sixties and early seventies. The writings of Rowland (1982) and Haight and 
Weinstein (1981) go beyond simple historical description to provide productive critical analyses of this 
period. 
6The definition of television and radio as primarily commercial enterprises with attendant 
consumer concerns is evident throughout the history of .American broadcasting and broad- cast 
regulation. From their earliest years, radio and television were regulated as "interstate commerce" in 
accordance with the Constitution's interstate "commerce clause"' of Article I. Section 8. Thus, 
congressional oversight of radio and television has long been justified by broadcasting's commercial 
"nature." Along these lines, it. is interesting to note that important challenges to segregation came through 
the commercial sector, and found legal grounding in interstate commerce regulation (for example, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission’s orders to abolish  Jim Crow facilities and practices). 
7Although the 1964 petition to deny the license ofWLB"1"-TV followed local field work and 
studies conducted in 1963, 1963-64 was not the first period of local complaint against the station. 
African-American efforts to change local broadcast practices began earlier, prior to the intention and 
involvement of the UCC. Specifically, Medgar Evers and the NAACP filed complaints against the 
segregationist practices of the station in 1955 and 1957. In the latter year, WLBTs treatment of the Little 
Rock school crisis prompted Evers to request airtime. He was denied. The FCC showed no interest in 
intervention, though made aware of the situation by the NAACP. In 1957 the Commission granted WLBT 
a "license to cover construction permit," and in 1959 renewed the station’s license without a hearing on 
local complaints (40 FCC 479). 
8Streeter (1990) offers a description of the intellectual contributions made by the critical legal 
studies (CLS) movement as well as a discussion of             applications to communications policy It 
should be noted that within critical scholarship, the work of CLS students has been variously challenged 
and complimented by texts engaging the perspectives  of African Americans. Legal analysts such as 
Patricia Williams (1991), Derrick Bell (1987. 1992), and Kimberlee Crenshaw (1988) show an 
appreciation for CLS interventions while maintaining important differences. and provide insights 
regarding  the racial politics of law and its operations. 
9President Kennedy mentioned the ""All Channel Receiver Bill,·· then pending adoption b) 
Congress,  in his  1962 "Consumer  Interest" address.  In this speech the president  also touched on other 
"consumer" concerns being addressed by the administration, including television programming.  In part, 
Kennedy  stated,  ''The  Federal  Communications   Communications Commission is actively  reviewing 
the  television network program selection  process and encouraging the expanded  development  of 
educational  television  stations'" ("Public papers."  p.  2  7). 
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10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I consider this parallel. 
11 Rowland ( 1982) argues along these lines in regard to the broadcast reform efforts of the 
sixties and seventies, highlighting "The symbolic dimension of the process, the significance of broadcast 
reform as part of an overall political legitimization-of ratification of prior structural arrangements and 
power allocations..."(p. 3). Examples of bureaucratic retrenchment in regard to citizen standing are 
perhaps most obvious in the FCC's erection of a procedural labyrinth for citizen petitioners, beginning in 
1972 (see 'The Public and Broad- casting-A Procedure Manual," September 26, 1972, 37 FCC 2d 286). 
In its complex "'Procedure Manual'" for citizens' groups, the FCC made it clear that broadcast 
performance inquiries were to be initiated by private citizens, not the commission, and that the burden of 
proof rested on the shoulders of challenging parties (Rowland, 1982, p. 17). 
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